by RNS | Sep 6, 2026 | Beating Tsundoku
William E. Hiestand, Tanks in the Caucasus 1942-43 (Osprey, 2026)
Tank warfare on the Eastern Front in World War II conjures up images of hundreds of tanks fighting across wide open plains. But, as William Hiestand illustrates in this Osprey New Vanguard series book, the Caucasus theatre was unusual because the German panzers initially outnumbered the Soviet T-34s, then the Soviets fought back using a variety of Allied lend-lease tanks.
Hiestand opens with the launching of Operation Barbarossa on 22 June 1941, noting that through the opening phases, the Germans operated combined-arms formations that used better doctrine, organisation, and tactics to defeat their enemies. But they ground down in Russia, encountering supply problems and finding tanks hard to replace. Seizing the Caucasus oilfields became Germany’s primary task for its armour in the southeast. Hiestand describes the German tank formations assigned to the task then moves on to the Soviets. They were rebuilding and reorganising, which Hiestand walks us through, but they were short of home produced tanks. The Allied Lend-Lease programme helped with that. Hiestand describes the tanks from both sides: German Panzerkampfwagen IIs, IIIs, and IVs, the new Tigers, Stugs, Marder IIs, and specialised command tanks; Soviet T-26s, BT-7s, T-34s, KV1s, T-60s, and T-70s; and the Allied Lend-Lease tanks, including Valentines, Stuarts, and Grants.
Having set the scene, Hiestand narrates the campaign. He begins with Operation Edelweiss and Germany’s panzers driving towards the Caucasus oilfields, brushing aside the meagre Soviet defences. But Soviet resistance stiffened behind defence-friendly terrain while nipping at the German advance, which ground to a halt before reaching key strategic objectives. The failure to capture Stalingrad threatened the German position in the Caucasus, and they siphoned off units to assist the beleaguered city. The Soviets, meanwhile, were a gathering storm, aided by the infusion of Lend-Lease tanks. Conversely, the loss of tanks adversely affected the Germans, which was not helped by grinding Soviet frontal attacks. By August 1943, argues Hiestand, both sides were exhausted and offensive operations ceased. The Germans would eventually withdraw. In his analysis, Hiestand emphasises the qualitative German advantage over the Soviets, but as the campaign wore on, the Soviets regained cohesion and were able to launch costly counterattacks that halted then turned the German offensive.
Tanks in the Caucasus is an interesting and informative overview of combat on the eastern front. Hiestand lays out the context and technical aspects of the campaign and provides a useful operational narrative of events. I would like to have seen a bit more on how the combat was fought at a more granular level, particularly with regard to the Soviet use of the Lend-Lease tanks, but that is not the remit of these New Vanguard books, and Hiestand includes a handy bibliography for those seeking more in-depth coverage. Readers of the Eastern Front will enjoy this somewhat different slice of the campaign, and tank enthusiasts will, of course, lap it up.
by RNS | Sep 1, 2026 | Beating Tsundoku
Steven J. Zaloga, US Tank Tactics in World War II (Osprey, 2026)
Tanks are synonymous with land combat in World War II. German panzers appear to take up most interest amongst tank enthusiasts, with the American tanks lagging behind. That is perhaps appropriate given that the US lagged behind when it came to developing tank warfare and tactics. In this book, in Osprey’s Elite series, Steven Zaloga surveys the US’s efforts to catch up with other powers as they entered World War II and the sometimes painful lessons they learned along the way.
Stemming from their WWI experience, US tank tactics were focused on infantry support, and tanks were distributed across infantry units. The US stuck to this theory even as the alarm bells of war started ringing in the 1930s, but Germany’s blitzkrieg changed all that. When France fell, the US adopted mechanisation. Zaloga narrates that development and then delves into the rudiments of US tanks, tactics, and organisation. He describes the light and medium tanks and demonstrates that the most basic tactic was centred on the tank’s crew and their drills. From 1940, the infantry support function remained, but a more destructive component was added. Zaloga works his way through the organisation of tanks formed into platoons, companies, battalions, regiments, and divisions. But these were all untested until 1943, and combat inevitably leads to change. That takes Zaloga into North Africa and Sicily, the lessons for the latter gleaned from failures in the former. A renewed emphasis on infantry support was a major change but one that that was difficult to effect given the war’s spread into the Pacific and the demands of the service. Zaloga notes also that the demands on tanks in France would be different from the other theatres. Getting tanks onto the D-Day beaches was one such problem that the US needed to negotiate; dealing with Normandy’s infamous bocage was another. Zaloga examines the thorny problem of communications between tanks and between tanks and infantry. That involved experimenting with radios and telephones. The use of tanks in a breakthrough situation was also a tactical requirement that was tested in France, as was the new obstacle of fighting in urban environments. Zaloga highlights the rarity of tank vs tank combat before September 1944 in Lorraine, where superior US tactics defeated the heavier German panzers. Then came the Battle of the Bulge that December, where German and US tank forces ground each other down. Zaloga notes the importance of combined arms tactics in all of this. Zaloga turns to the Pacific theatre and the deployment of amphibious tanks by the US Marines and their subsequent use as artillery as well as infantry support. Zaloga concludes with the lessons the US learned from World War II and the reorganisation of 1947.
Steven Zaloga has written an engaging and informative survey of US tank warfare in World War II, which is well supported by Osprey’s usual excellent graphic artwork and photographs. He balances a discussion of both the organisation of tanks and tactics as they evolved to uncover a story of assumptions tested by combat and the lessons American commanders drew from that. He also provides examples of US tanks in combat told from the viewpoint of the participants. However, Zaloga’s focus is primarily on the war against Germany, and he gives the Pacific theatre a thin veneer of attention. He might have been better served to ignore the Pacific and change the title. Nevertheless, readers of World War II will enjoy reading this introductory work, which Zaloga notes fills a puzzling gap in the literature on US tank warfare.
by RNS | Aug 28, 2026 | Beating Tsundoku
Raffaele D’Amato, Roman Army Units in the Eastern Provinces (3), (Osprey, 2026)
There is little doubt that the massive Roman Empire came under severe external military pressure in the 4th and 5th centuries CE. That had forced a split, with Constantinople becoming the capital of the Eastern Empire, requiring two different Roman armies and strategies. In this Osprey Men-at-Arms series book, Raffaele D’Amato surveys the Roman army in the East during this period.
D’Amato begins with Constantine I’s reorganisation of the Roman Army to perform border protection and provincial control backed by field armies located in strategic positions. D’Amato outlines the composition of the army in the East, including a detailed listing of unit distribution. The multiplicity of peoples incorporated into the Eastern Roman army was reflected in their weaponry, equipment, and uniforms. D’Amato takes us on a tour of the provinces, examining those variations. He covers Dacia, Macedonia, Thracia, Pontus, Asia, Oriens, and Aegyptus. The accompanying artwork adds the garrison of Constantinople to the list.
This is a brief but useful survey of the Roman army in the Eastern provinces, with a bibliography added for those who want to delve further. D’Amato’s informative text is neatly arranged and ably supported by artistic renditions of the soldiers and many photographs of archaeological artefacts. Readers with more than a passing interest in the period will enjoy this book, though general readers might need a wee bit of background knowledge to get the benefits of D’Amato’s work.
by RNS | Aug 25, 2026 | Beating Tsundoku
Anthony Spalinger, Kadesh 1286 BC (Osprey, 2026)
Imagine over ten-thousand chariots racing into combat on a flat plain, dust clouds flowing behind wheels, sheets of arrows raining down on horses and men, and warriors stabbing and hacking at each other while chariot drivers desperately tried to control their horses. That is what happened at history’s first recorded major organised battle between the Hittites and Egyptians at Kadesh in the 13th Century BCE. In this Osprey Campaign series book, Anthony Spalinger analyses the action.
Spalinger opens by narrating the contextual situation in southern Syria that provided the flashpoint between the Hittites and Egyptians. Controlling Kadesh, Spalinger notes, would allow that power to control the region. After skipping through very brief biographies of the opposing commanders, Spalinger delves into analysing the main primary sources. Readers need to pay attention to this because the rest of Spalinger’s study of the battle can only be understood properly through following Spalinger’s assessment. Spalinger breaks down the opposing forces, though he mixes that with some narrative elements of the campaign. He then goes into more details of the campaign, beginning with the Egyptians arriving at Kadesh where the forewarned Hittites eagerly awaited to ambush them. They attacked with only two Egyptian divisions capable of fighting back. But Rameses II led a counter-attack, driving the Hittites back across the Orontes river. Then a second Hittite attack was repulsed, leaving the sides glowering over the river at each other before, after some performative action and talks, the Egyptians withdrew. Spalinger intersperses that relatively straightforward narrative with analysis and conclusions drawn from the sources, making the action difficult to follow at times. He concludes that this was a ‘momentous and decisive’ battle because it ended Egyptian imperialism, though Spalinger concedes that the battle did not end the war between the two powers.
It is important to note that this account of Kadesh is not a survey, but a stripped-down study written by an academic historian. To that end, much of the narrative flow is lost in analytical breakdowns as Spalinger weaves his way through the sources. There is a lack of clarity at times as a result. Despite Spalinger’s simplifying of his technical notes, this did not quite work in this format, and a reader encountering Kadesh for the first time might need a basic narrative outline of the battle before attempting this book. Fortunately, Osprey covered the battle a bit more loosely, and a bit livelier, in Qadesh 1300 BC (Campaign #22), written by Mark Healy. My recommendation is to read Healy first then Spalinger. Then dive into Spalinger’s excellent bibliography for further reading. Readers that enjoy a more academic approach to their battles will get the most out of Spalinger’s book, but any reader of ancient warfare will enjoy this too.
by RNS | Aug 18, 2026 | Beating Tsundoku
Mark Lardas, Philippines 1941-42 (Osprey, 2026)
Picture the scene: Clark airfield in the Philippines on 8 December 1941. The news arrives of the attack on Pearl Harbor, but the Americans at Clark airfield have no idea what’s about to hit them. The disaster that follows sets off a desperate rearguard action by the Americans, but one that is ultimately doomed. In this Osprey Air Campaign volume, Mark Lardas describes the men, their machines, and the action that set the tone for the Pacific air war.
Lardas begins with the attack on Clark airfield to set the scene before surveying the Japanese aircraft, their facilities, and their weapons and tactics honed on fighting in Chinese skies. In response, argues Lardas, the US had many aircraft and facilities, but the planes were obsolete and the infrastructure inadequate. They would pay a high price for that. As for the campaign objectives, Japanese expansion began in China in the 1930s and spread, but the Philippines stood in the way of their full imperialist ambitions. To capture the Philippines would require amphibious landings supported by air power. The US was a somewhat reluctant defender of the Philippines, Lardas contends, but they could not let the Japanese stroll in to seize power. They thought they had the resources and correct strategy, in accordance with local forces, but they had badly miscalculated.
The campaign narrative Lardas embarks upon delves into the preparations and build-up of forces, leading into the attack on Clark airfield. The Japanese quickly secured an airfield in the Philippines, but the major initial attacks came from Formosa. In what Lardas describes as a ‘cascade of failure’, Clark airfield succumbed to a surprise raid that destroyed many US aircraft. Despite that, the Americans could still put serviceable aircraft into the air to attack Japanese landings and supply ships. Nevertheless, the Japanese attacks on US airfields intensified until, within a few days, the air campaign over the Philippines heavily favoured Japan. As the Japanese invasion progressed, US supplies were lost in addition to more aircraft, and the remainder were withdrawn. But, Lardas notes, the US still launched limited counter-strikes until the Philippines finally fell on 1 May 1942. Lardas assesses the competing campaigns as one of tight tactical Japanese doctrine against the unfocused US effort.
The front cover of this book tells you all that you need to know about what happened in the Philippines. It depicts an obsolete US warplane under intense fire from a Japanese fighter. This singular exercise in futility is reflected across the campaign, and Mark Lardas’s survey captures that very well, highlighting the progressive collapse of the US air effort in conjunction with events on the ground. He assesses the competing forces and finds that the outcome could have perhaps been different if the US had adopted an alternative strategy, although that dips into the realms of ‘what-if’ history a bit too far. Lardas is ably supported by Osprey’s usual high quality graphics and maps. Overall, this is an excellent addition to the Air Campaign series, and one that will appeal to military history readers in general and those interested in the Pacific Theatre in particular.
