Michael O. Fallon, Hill 119 (Casemate, 2025)
Hill 119 was a barren rise on a finger of terrain, lying south of Danang in South Vietnam, with a 360 degree view of so-called ‘Indian Country’. Delta Company, 1st Recon Battalion, 1st Marine Division manned an Observation Post (OP) on the hill for 600 consecutive days in 1969 and 1970. They also took part in up to week-long recon patrols; while on the hill, they called in artillery and air-strikes on enemy movements. The enemy was the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army, and particular, 2nd NVA Division’s T89 Sapper Battalion.
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Michael O. Fallon begins his narrative with a geo-strategic overview for the year of ‘Vietnamization’, 1969. He homes in on Vietnam, relating how the Americans created a base on Hill 119 to cover the area 15 miles south of Da Nang known as Go Noi Island, sandwiched between two rivers, which was a Viet Cong and NVA stronghold and a staging area for attacks on Da Nang. The US also designated the island as a Free Fire Zone and conducted occasional sweeps to clear out the enemy. The small contingent of Marines on the hill was exposed to the elements, the rain and especially heat, so that Fallon, who served on the hill, remembered it as ‘a hot rock in Vietnam’.
With their OP established, the marines conducted morning patrols to check the protective wire and to carry out after-action assessments. They also set ambushes, interdicted enemy movements, recovered downed pilots when necessary, investigated villages and caves, and captured prisoners for interrogation. All that activity sometimes led to direct encounters with enemy troops, but more often they spent their time and energy avoiding enemy booby traps. They also made continuous improvements in the base for defence and living. By November 1969, an observation tower dominated the hill, with mortar pits and other bunkers dotted around to form an overlapping defensive structure. The OP’s primary function was to monitor enemy movements and call down artillery fire or airstrikes on them. Fallon notes that the Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) was the body count of enemy dead. The OP’s mission was aided by the introduction of a Secret Integrated Observation Device, which led to greater enemy casualties.
Of course, the NVA leadership found the OP more than an irritant, but their probes into the security of the hill was met with M79 HE rounds, and mortar, sniper, and machine gun fire. Nevertheless, an enemy assault on the hill seemed inevitable. One such plan was foiled by the Marines in early 1970, but in August, the assault came only to be repulsed with intense fire from the hill and covering artillery fire. Political circumstances, however, would succeed where direct assault could not, with the Nixon administration’s drawdown of US forces, which included the Marines. All the NVA had to do was wait out the Americans, and they would leave, which is exactly what happened. It was not just the enemy in the open that the Marines would have to worry about: Fallon argues that then men on Hill 119 could never quite come to grips with the local civilians and their needs and requests. This was exemplified in their dealings with a seemingly innocuous one-armed woman from a local village who visited often and who, many years later, was confirmed as a local Viet Cong leader. The clumsy interactions with locals led to the killing of another civilian woman, which ended in a court martial for the Marine sniper involved, though he was finally acquitted. In March 1971, the Marines left Hill 119 for good, destroying their defences behind them. The still bald hill slowly returned to nature.
Hill 119 is a nuts-and-bolts look at a small slice of the Vietnam War. Fallon notes that his book was written for today’s Marines and to honour the veterans who he fought alongside. He conducted one-hundred interviews and checked those against documentary sources and tactical maps, some of which he reproduces in the text. He leaves nothing out, including a constant flow of administrative and organisational changes, discussions of tactics, narratives of operations, and a detailed account of a court-martial. That attention to detail, some of which could easily have been transferred to footnotes, created an uneven account, with passages of concentrated action separated by long sections of routine and often humdrum events – much like the War itself by all accounts. The chapter structure is also somewhat mechanical, opening with the wider political context then zooming into Marine activities surrounding Hill 119. The overall effect is not as monotonous as it might sound, but there is so much detail included that the book grinds rather than flows. That said, there is much to admire in Fallon’s rigorous research and writing, and it is fair to say that he achieved his purpose. Readers of the Vietnam War will devour this book, which provides a valuable insight into what the US Marines on Hill 119 did and how they did it.
