Rome’s Best Laid Plans?
Paul Coby, Forts and Roman Strategy (Pen & Sword, 2022)
Most readers with more than a passing acquaintance with the Roman conquest of Britain will know the general outline of that endeavour. The question remains, however, whether or not the various campaigns into what is now Wales and Scotland were part of a grand strategy? Paul Coby takes a swing at that conundrum using a set of analytical tools derived from his many years of experience in database analysis and visualisation and organisational theory and practice. Coby’s book is split into two parts: a set of case studies, and an overview of his methodology. Coby backs the strategic approach for the Roman conquest but allows for opportunistic predatory instincts to operate within that framework. He tests his thesis by analysing five campaigns: Scapula’s failed campaign in Wales, Gallus’ containment of Wales, Frontinus’s success in Wales, Agricola’s advance into Scotland, and the establishment of the Antonine Wall.
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For Wales, it took a Roman Army unsuited to fighting guerilla warfare three decades to overcome mountainous terrain and tribal resistance. In 47 CE, Roman governor Ostorius Scapula defeated an Iceni rebellion then ravaged the ‘Welsh’ Deceangli and Silures in turn. The Ordovices would prove a tougher nut to crack, despite an initial battlefield victory, before a resurgent Silures counterattacked. Scapula seems to have died from exhaustion brought on by the campaigns. Coby analyses the Roman marching camps, forts, and roads, along with Legionary ‘fronts’ to discern the Roman strategy and track their armies. He concludes that Scapula’s aggression resulted in ‘complete failure’ because he pursued conquest over consolidation.
The next Roman governor, Didius Gallus, opted for a policy of containment. Coby posits a line of forts between two legionary fortresses that projected power into tribal areas. Suetonius Paulinus then attempted to complete the conquest, but Boudica’s rebellion in the east aborted that plan. Matters elsewhere in the Empire superseded Britain’s importance, and Wales would wait over a decade to meet its conqueror, Julius Frontinus. Coby describes Frontinus’ campaign as a ‘masterclass’. This was conducted in progressive phases that Coby narrates with the aid of maps and his Data-Led Analytical Method (D-LAM) method. Frontinus did not finish the job, however; that was left for Julius Agricola who had little to do but did it well.
Agricola’s campaigns in Scotland were, Coby argues, an ‘ideal test case’ for his D-LAM method. He describes the historical context and physical environment for the campaigns then establishes the Flavian frontier along the Forth-Clyde isthmus from where Agricola headed north. Coby plots probable marching routes and discusses the archaeological evidence of forts and roads before and after the Battle of Mons Graupius. Coby is convinced that a Flavian frontier system existed, anchored by the legionary fortress at Inchtuthil, but he acknowledges that the forts as a system are open to interpretation.
After positing his interpretation of Agricola’s chronology, Coby gives a favourable assessment of the campaign leading to Mons Graupius, though the aftermath was a strategic failure. He then speculates on the potential grand conquest that would have followed if the Romans had not withdrawn. Coby draws the story of the conquests in Wales and Scotland together, highlighting six phases: reconnaissance, invasion, occupation, incorporation, revolt, and assimilation.
Staying in Scotland, Coby’s final case study is the building of the Antonine Wall and the full conquest of southern Scotland. He considers this as a military overstretch by the Romans that resulted in another withdrawal. Coby follows the twin advance by Lollius Urbicus to the Forth-Clyde isthmus and the subsequent occupation of the southern tribes. The Romans then built their wall along the isthmus, though Coby highlights that what the Romans may have intended was not what they built. He works his way through the troubled history of the wall as it faced local resistance with too few troops to defend it properly. Coby concludes that the Antonine occupation was almost ‘textbook’ and that we have to view the occupation as a whole, not just the wall. After considering the forces involved and the purpose of the wall, Coby speculates on the Roman withdrawal to the Hadrian’s Wall line and how that worked. He decides that the retreat was ultimately a sign of strategic failure, but the whole episode was still evidence of Roman strategic planning.
In Part 2, Coby explains his methodology. He notes that there has been little effort in modern maps to distinguish types of forts and their usage. Coby’s ‘cartographic manifesto’ fixes that. The regularity of Roman fort-building practice helps him, and that extends to the Roman Army too. Having gathered his data for all the forts, Coby describes his analytical method (D-LAM), which is a database with standardised entries we can use for comparing forts. Coby takes that a step further to create Strength Factors based on fort sizes and troop strengths. Every fort, therefore, is mapped as accurately as possible, revealing connections from which, in conjunction with a wide range of ‘context tools’, we can derive Roman strategies. Thus, in his conclusions, Coby agrees with Edward Luttwak’s grand strategy thesis for the Roman Empire, at least in Britain. From his test cases, however, Coby discerns a pattern of tactical victories and strategic defeats caused primarily by overstretched Roman resources. He closes with an interesting aside on where readers can visit some of the main sites mentioned in the text.
Paul Coby has written a thought-provoking book, which is well supported by copious diagrams, maps, and tables. His effort to codify the archaeology of the various campaigns and make that synchronise with the available history is notable, and it is a method worth applying to other parts of the Roman empire. Coby’s deployment analysis charts and typology diagrams invite interpretation and bolster his own. Coby also draws useful analyses from other empires and colonial campaigns, most notably Britain’s Victorian empire. What the reader will gain from this approach, however, might well depend on how much they favour Luttwak’s grand strategy thesis for Roman conquests, and some of Coby’s conclusions contain more than a hint of teleological reasoning. While he acknowledges the speculative nature of many of his arguments, Coby does not enter into discussions with alternative interpretations, and that is sometimes disappointing. A cynical or hostile reader will pick apart Coby’s uncertainties and will note his admission on one theory as a ‘hypothesis built on assumption and interpolation’. Nevertheless, Coby’s approach may be a valuable tool, and students of Roman Britain will gain much from adding it to their own research.
