by RNS | Feb 21, 2026 | Beating Tsundoku
Hugues Canuel, French Navy 1939-42 (Osprey, 2026)
For the casual history reader, the French Maritime nationale barely registers as one of the major navies in World War II. After all, the Royal Navy sank their ships early in the war, and that was that, right? In this book, Hugues Canuel argues otherwise. He sets out to restore the reputation of the Maritime nationale as a powerful modern navy in 1939 that for over two years effectively held up its end of the bargain.
The Marine nationale emerged from the Great War with its reputation intact but in need of modernisation. What emerged under the patronage of Minister of the Navy was a modern fleet capable of operating in the Mediterranean and across France’s empire. A more efficient command structure was also implemented. Faced with the gathering threats of fascist Italy and Germany, the French and British drew closer together in sharing their naval responsibilities. Canuel breaks down the French naval capability on the eve of war. France replaced its aging battleships, although some remained unfinished when France fell to the Germans, and older dreadnoughts were retained. The French also developed a new generation of heavy and light cruisers and destroyers. France’s submarine fleet in 1939 was arguably the most advanced in the world, argues Canuel, there were 77 of them in three categories for operational purposes. However, the French lagged behind in naval airpower. France also tried to modernise its technical capabilities but was hampered by budgetary problems and competing defence demands. This was evident in gunnery, radar and anti-submarine technology, and anti-aircraft weapons were not up to the demands of combatting increasingly improved aircraft in World War II. That unpreparedness extended to naval armour protection, except for the Richelieu battleships.
Canuel critiques the apparent improvements in command and control and strategic planning as superficial when it came to war. He analyses those aspects of the French Navy in some detail, noting the command structure and the differences between the home fleets and the colonial fleets, all formulated under the auspices of Admiral Darlan. Canuel also explains the inconsistencies of French intelligence, putting them behind the other major European navies. The French fleets did not lack for logistical bases and support across the empire, but they lacked shipbuilding capacity, and they were overstretched when supplying and defending distant bases. Canuel plots the various French fleets on the outbreak of war, then he embarks on his narrative of operations.
Even the best laid plans struggle with actual combat. That was certainly the case for the French, argues Canuel. In the so-called Phoney War, the French navy busied itself escorting convoys and hunting enemy raiders, sometimes in concert with the Royal Navy. The biggest threat, however, seems to have been catastrophic accidents in port. The French took a significant part in the Narvik operation in April 1940, where their lack of air defences proved fateful. By May 1940, the Marine nationale had performed well, according to Canuel, but then the roof fell in when France collapsed. The French navy played an unheralded but important role at Dunkirk and other evacuations from the French coast, all under heavy German air attacks. With the French surrender, however, the Allied problem was what to do with French ships now under Axis control. The answer was to seize or sink them, leaving a rump fleet to fight on for Vichy France. Engagements with the RN followed, but the French lost ships off Casablanca and then scuttled the high seas fleet at Toulon in November 1942.
In his analysis of the French navy, Canuel argues that the war highlighted what happens when military strategy meets political collapse. The French, he continues, had built a powerful modern navy that carried out its duties professionally and effectively despite weaknesses in anti-aircraft and anti-submarine capabilities. His argument is persuasive, at least on the surface level at which it is presented in this survey. Canuel’s book reads well as a protracted essay that highlights the earnest development of the Marine nationale, and its successes and failures in the war. He supplements his main text with illuminating box-out sections that delve a little deeper into important elements of that history. Canuel is ably supported by Osprey’s excellent graphic art and selection of illustrative photos. Readers of World War II naval history, in particular, will enjoy reading Canuel’s book, but any military enthusiast will do so too.
by RNS | Feb 13, 2026 | Beating Tsundoku
Angus Konstam, Okinawa 1945 (Osprey, 2026)
Having been all but swept from the seas in the Far East, and with their attention elsewhere, it took until Spring 1944 for the Royal Navy to establish a high seas fleet in that theatre. This was the British Pacific Fleet, which was rebranded Task Force 57 to work alongside US forces as their invasion of Okinawa approached. The Royal Navy’s mission was to bomb Japanese airfields, but that drew the attention of the infamous kamikaze suicide attacks. Angus Konstam narrates that story.
Konstam sets up his story by analysing the forces involved. Task Force 57 laboured under logistical problems, relying on a fleet train of supply ships sailing back and forward to Australia from the Task Force’s operational area. TF57 used radar to track enemy aircraft, deployed ships in concentric circles for in-depth defensive fire, and positioned Combat Air Patrols (CAP) overhead. The Task Force used mainly US aircraft, including Corsair and Hellcat fighters and Avengers for dive-bombing. Some Seafires were also used, but they were not as good as the US planes. Konstam notes an important aspect of the RN carriers having steel decks, which were more resistant to damage but reduced the number of aircraft that could be carried. It was a trade-off that worked well for the Task Force when the kamikazes arrived.
The target for Task Force 57 was the Ryushu Islands, and ultimately Okinawa, which was well-defended by the Japanese. That included over 77,000 men on Okinawa and more on adjacent islands. The Japanese aircraft included Oscars and Zekes, and some Tojos, as fighters. For bombing, they used Bettys and Judys. But it was the kamikazes that posed the greatest threat. In this campaign, 2,000 kamikaze pilots would die. They sank quite a few ships, all American, but they only dented the Allied navies’ capacity to tighten the noose on Japan.
As he moves into his narrative, Konstam outlines the Royal Navy’s role within the broader strategic objectives laid down by US command as Operation Iceberg. That was to protect the US fleet’s flank by suppressing Japanese air activity in the Sakishima Islands. What followed was a grinding battle of Fleet Air Arm air raids on Japanese airfields, which the defenders would repair overnight, forcing renewed attacks the next day. Rince and repeat. Konstam narrates the relentless actions of the FAA bombing missions in March 1945. The Japanese struck back with kamikazes for the first time on 1 April, hitting HMS Indefatigable. The Task Force continued operations through April and May under the constant threat of attack, including attacks on Formosa. Very few of the Japanese planes made it through, but some did. On 4 May, a kamikaze hit HMS Formidable. She was hit again five days later, along with HMS Victorious. The bombing of airfields continued, however, until after two months, the RN Task Force left the theatre, job done. Konstam concludes that the Royal Navy’s Task Force 57 had performed a small but important mission against Japan.
Okinawa 1945 is a solid addition to Osprey’s Air Campaign series. Konstam lays out all the background material readers need to know before he embarks on an attention-grabbing, blow-by-blow account of Task Force 57’s operations. That is somewhat repetitive, as I am sure the FAA pilots would have agreed, but Konstam handles it well, interspersing the routine FAA attacks on airfields with the drama of kamikaze attacks on the Task Force ships. Konstam is aided by Osprey’s outstanding graphic artwork and some excellent combat photographs. Readers of the Pacific War will enjoy Konstam’s book as will students of military history looking for an introductory work on this important naval operation.
by RNS | Feb 2, 2026 | Beating Tsundoku
Mark Stille, Midway (Osprey, 2026)
In June 1942, a powerful Japanese fleet closed in on the small islands of Midway in the Pacific Ocean. They planned to capture Midway and draw out the US Pacific fleet to crush it, hoping to bring the US to the negotiating table. The main problem the Japanese had was that the Americans knew they were coming and were waiting for them to sail into a devastating ambush. Many have argued that the ensuing US victory was the decisive battle of the Pacific War. Historian Mark Stille disagrees with that assessment in this thoughtful and well-argued account of a battle that in retrospect seems almost pre-ordained.
Stille begins his journey to Midway in the Indian Ocean, with a Japanese task force under the command of Admiral Nagumo operating against the Royal Navy. Stille argues that some of the flaws that damaged the Japanese at Midway were exposed in that operation. For Midway, Stille describes a deeply flawed Japanese plan, ‘an illusion in every sense’, promoted by Admiral Yamamoto, a man with an inflated reputation. The Japanese, Stille argues, suffered from intelligence failures, a dissipation of forces, and wasted effort. He bursts the bubble of the myth of the desperate gamble against impossible odds on the part of the Americans. They had penetrated Japan’s plans, which allowed Nimitz to conceive a bold ambush. Stille also compares the fleets steaming towards each other across the Pacific Ocean and assesses the various commanders. He argues that the IJN offensive doctrine betrayed a fundamental hubris that led to a lack of adequate air defence, no early warning system, ineffective gunnery, and poor damage control. The US, on the other hand, employed radar and had sturdier aircraft, with the exception of the vulnerable and obsolete Devastator. Midway itself was heavily defended and unlikely to fall to Japanese invasion. With all that in place, Stille works his way through the narrative of the battle.
We join the Japanese fleet ignoring signs of US naval activity, which Stille argues was indicative of their ‘inflexibility and lack of imagination’. On 3 June, the Japanese targeted Midway with minimal success. The next day, the Japanese failed to find any signs of the closing US fleet. That allowed the American aircraft to strike first. Though their air operation was disorganised, that may have helped the Americans and created confusion in the Japanese fleet. Stille highlights Nagumo quickly losing control of the battle, then he started to lose the carriers as US dive-bombers struck home. A Japanese counter-attack damaged the US carrier Yorktown but also left the remaining IJN air squadrons diminished. Moreover, their attack revealed the last IJN carrier, which the Americans were quick to assault. The loss of all the IJN carriers brought the primary battle to a close, with some USN air attacks continuing on fleeing IJN cruisers, one of which was sunk.
Stille examines the reasons for the Japanese defeat, which amounted to a flawed IJN plan and faulty intelligence, and they broke all the principles of warfare. Yamamoto’s reputation as a brilliant admiral was undeserved and his IJN commanders committed too many errors, leaving victory almost impossible to achieve. Their air defence system also failed under the influence of Japanese ‘Victory Disease’, the hubris that comes from winning. For the Americans, Nimitz’s high risk plan worked despite tactical errors. Admiral Fletcher’s performance, Stille contends, was ‘flawless’, and while Admiral Spruance was hampered by staff incompetence, that was offset by excellent leaders amongst the squadrons. Ultimately, Stille concludes, ‘the Americans assembled the bare minimum required for victory.’ He notes the common view that Midway was a David and Goliath battle but argues that this was not the case. Midway was not the decisive battle of the Pacific War, but it decisively ended Japanese expansion. The US seized the strategic initiative, but even if they had not, the US industrial trajectory to support the war effort would have inevitably defeated Japan. Stille includes a what-if argument over the intended Japanese assault on Midway island, which he concludes was also destined for failure, and an alternative timeline for the Battle of Midway based on changing small events to affect the greater outcome. That, Stille argues, would have remained much the same as the historical timeline.
Mark Stille’s Midway is an engrossing analysis of the most famous battle of the Pacific War. Befitting his own career, Stille’s emphasis is on the intelligence side of the battle, from its inception to controlling the battle space while the chaotic fighting raged across the waves. Stille burrows into the minds of the commanders, analysing all the components of the battle as the commanders knew them, then he reconstructs their intended plans from the evidence. His conclusions differ from many previous attempts to understand, and in many cases, glorify the American victory. Stille’s interpretation is well-argued and posits a more predictable victory than others have suggested. He is undoubtedly correct in most of his assertions, making this a book to be reckoned with by future historians, though to this reviewer, Stille downplays the role of US initiative especially when set against the Japanese rigidity that he describes to great effect. Students of Midway have to read this book to grasp the full picture of that immense and important battle
