Hugues Canuel, French Navy 1939-42 (Osprey, 2026)
For the casual history reader, the French Maritime nationale barely registers as one of the major navies in World War II. After all, the Royal Navy sank their ships early in the war, and that was that, right? In this book, Hugues Canuel argues otherwise. He sets out to restore the reputation of the Maritime nationale as a powerful modern navy in 1939 that for over two years effectively held up its end of the bargain.
The Marine nationale emerged from the Great War with its reputation intact but in need of modernisation. What emerged under the patronage of Minister of the Navy was a modern fleet capable of operating in the Mediterranean and across France’s empire. A more efficient command structure was also implemented. Faced with the gathering threats of fascist Italy and Germany, the French and British drew closer together in sharing their naval responsibilities. Canuel breaks down the French naval capability on the eve of war. France replaced its aging battleships, although some remained unfinished when France fell to the Germans, and older dreadnoughts were retained. The French also developed a new generation of heavy and light cruisers and destroyers. France’s submarine fleet in 1939 was arguably the most advanced in the world, argues Canuel, there were 77 of them in three categories for operational purposes. However, the French lagged behind in naval airpower. France also tried to modernise its technical capabilities but was hampered by budgetary problems and competing defence demands. This was evident in gunnery, radar and anti-submarine technology, and anti-aircraft weapons were not up to the demands of combatting increasingly improved aircraft in World War II. That unpreparedness extended to naval armour protection, except for the Richelieu battleships.
Canuel critiques the apparent improvements in command and control and strategic planning as superficial when it came to war. He analyses those aspects of the French Navy in some detail, noting the command structure and the differences between the home fleets and the colonial fleets, all formulated under the auspices of Admiral Darlan. Canuel also explains the inconsistencies of French intelligence, putting them behind the other major European navies. The French fleets did not lack for logistical bases and support across the empire, but they lacked shipbuilding capacity, and they were overstretched when supplying and defending distant bases. Canuel plots the various French fleets on the outbreak of war, then he embarks on his narrative of operations.
Even the best laid plans struggle with actual combat. That was certainly the case for the French, argues Canuel. In the so-called Phoney War, the French navy busied itself escorting convoys and hunting enemy raiders, sometimes in concert with the Royal Navy. The biggest threat, however, seems to have been catastrophic accidents in port. The French took a significant part in the Narvik operation in April 1940, where their lack of air defences proved fateful. By May 1940, the Marine nationale had performed well, according to Canuel, but then the roof fell in when France collapsed. The French navy played an unheralded but important role at Dunkirk and other evacuations from the French coast, all under heavy German air attacks. With the French surrender, however, the Allied problem was what to do with French ships now under Axis control. The answer was to seize or sink them, leaving a rump fleet to fight on for Vichy France. Engagements with the RN followed, but the French lost ships off Casablanca and then scuttled the high seas fleet at Toulon in November 1942.
In his analysis of the French navy, Canuel argues that the war highlighted what happens when military strategy meets political collapse. The French, he continues, had built a powerful modern navy that carried out its duties professionally and effectively despite weaknesses in anti-aircraft and anti-submarine capabilities. His argument is persuasive, at least on the surface level at which it is presented in this survey. Canuel’s book reads well as a protracted essay that highlights the earnest development of the Marine nationale, and its successes and failures in the war. He supplements his main text with illuminating box-out sections that delve a little deeper into important elements of that history. Canuel is ably supported by Osprey’s excellent graphic art and selection of illustrative photos. Readers of World War II naval history, in particular, will enjoy reading Canuel’s book, but any military enthusiast will do so too.
