by RNS | Jan 28, 2025 | Beating Tsundoku
James H. Willbanks, Hamburger Hill 1969 (Osprey, 2024)
The Vietnamese called it Dong Ap Bia, just another mountain in South Vietnam. But the Americans who fought there would name it Hamburger Hill. Operation Apache Snow should have been a straightforward assault to take the high ground at the north end of the A Shau Valley from the NVA and block access into the interior of South Vietnam. But the Americans and their ARVN Allies bit off more than they could chew, and the attack became a ten-day battle of attrition that led to serious military and political consequences. In this new Osprey book in their Campaign series, James H. Willbanks tells the story.
The A Shau Valley, Willbanks notes, was one of several gateways into South Vietnam; one which the US had tried to close in 1966 but remained a thorn in their side into 1969. Their new plan, set for May 1969, would be to take down NVA bases in the valley and disrupt their logistics. Willbanks reviews the respective commanders, of which Lieutenant Colonel Weldon F. Honeycutt appears most often in the following narrative, and the organisation of the forces about to fight for control of Dong Ap Bia, designated Hill 937, and it’s neighbours. Operation Apache Snow opened on 10 May with a US barrage and helicopters inserting infantry into their jump-off areas. Honeycutt was in charge of the assault on Dong Ap Bia, but what he did not know was that he was badly outnumbered by a well dug-in NVA force. Forebodings of an NVA trap soon spread amongst the advancing US soldiers, then they ‘kicked over a hornet’s nest’ of enemy fire. The attack bogged down despite intense artillery fire and aerial bombardment. As attempt after attempt failed, US casualties grew while their morale dropped, which wasn’t helped by numerous incidences of friendly fire, but Honeycutt drove them on. Finally, after ten days of intense fighting, the NVA resistance collapsed. But only a few weeks later, the US withdrew its forces, sharpening the question, was it worth it? Politically, Willbanks makes clear that it was not, although US generals in Vietnam thought otherwise. US public opinion, already waning after the Tet Offensive, turned irrevocably against the Vietnam War, and Nixon called for the policy of Vietnamization. Hamburger Hill would therefore be the last action of its kind.
Hamburger Hill is one of the better know Vietnam War battles, partly through a 1987 movie dedicated to it, and because it was such a politically contentious affair back home in the US. If you have not heard of it, Willbanks’ introductory survey is a useful starting point. He controls the broader story well while picking out illustrative parts of the action on the ground. Willbanks’ narrative is heavily one-sided with the NVA set up as a mostly faceless enemy and bodies to be counted in the aftermath, but I doubt that most of his readers will object to that bias. He is ably supported by Osprey’s informative colourful maps and flavourful artwork. This is a book that provides a window into the Vietnam War, and beginners and ‘veteran’ readers alike will enjoy it.
by RNS | Jan 26, 2025 | Beating Tsundoku
Jaap Jan Brouwer, The German Way of War (Pen & Sword, 2021)
In The German Way of War, Jaap Jan Brouwer examines how World War II was fought by the German army and compares that to the two main Allied armies in the West: Britain and the United States. The Germans, Brouwer finds, adopted a command concept known as Auftragstaktik that diffused decision-making and initiative down through the ranks. That system compared favourably with the Americans and British in all the important aspects of infantry fighting, including army structure, leadership, training, and morale. Brouwer tests his thesis using examples mostly from the Italian, North African, and Western Fronts, with the Germans attempting to stave off Allied onslaughts in all three. In the end, he argues that the Allied victory was principally one of quantity over quality.
To make his case, Brouwer compares the strengths of the Germans to his perceived weaknesses of the Allies. Although based on the evidence, it is a selective approach open to counter-examples and contextual argument. In addition, Brouwer gives the Eastern Front little attention, and his argument that the German rank-and-file displayed little ideological motive is questionable. Thus, Brouwer’s thesis is not as strong as it first appears, but it is an interesting one to consider.
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by RNS | Jan 10, 2025 | Beating Tsundoku
Mark Lardas, USN Submarine v IJN Aircraft Carrier (Osprey, 2025)
It sounds improbable, like something out of a sensational war movie; a US submarine sinking an Imperial Japanese aircraft carrier. Yet, even with all the protection offered to carriers by escorting warships and air cover, this remarkable feat happened ten times in World War II. In this book in Osprey’s Duel series, Mark Lardas tracks the paths of two very different types of warships to their fateful destinations on the high seas.
Lardas takes turns in describing the design and development of US Navy fleet submarines and Imperial Japanese carriers. Both were vulnerable in their own ways with almost every aspect planned out for maximum combat efficiency. Lardas considers their respective structure, propulsion, and weaponry, including the American failure to recognise the deficiencies in their early war torpedoes. The men who operated these machines also come under Lardas’s scrutiny. Here too, he notes that almost everything was honed to winning in combat, but the Japanese were notably more so to the detriment of their damage control functions. That would play a critical role in the survivability of the carriers when struck by US torpedoes. Lardas selects five brief case studies to demonstrate his points, of which two stand out: the Nautilus’s problems with dud torpedoes in 1942 when attacking the Naga, and the Albacore’s sinking of the Taiho in 1944 when the latter’s failed damage control operations could not save the carrier. In his analysis of 67 combats between USN submarines and IJN carriers, Lardas highlights the procedure for a successful attack, particularly after 1943 when the US resolved it dud torpedo problem. Conversely, there were no submarines lost to Japanese carriers in the war. Lardas concludes that the USN submarines ultimately won the fight against the carriers.
There is always something useful to learn from Osprey books; the condensed nature of the shorter format effectively highlights the main points under discussion. That is the case too with Lardas’s latest contribution. I am not sure, though, that the structured format for the Duel series works well for combat between submarines and carriers, with the case studies almost squeezed out by technical aspects that sometimes seem tangential to the events. I would have liked to have read more on the combat, but that is a quibble more than a complaint. Nevertheless, as an introduction to this aspect of the war in the Pacific, Lardas’s book works well enough, and Osprey’s graphic artwork illustrates his text to the usual high standard.
