Mark Stille, Midway (Osprey, 2026)
In June 1942, a powerful Japanese fleet closed in on the small islands of Midway in the Pacific Ocean. They planned to capture Midway and draw out the US Pacific fleet to crush it, hoping to bring the US to the negotiating table. The main problem the Japanese had was that the Americans knew they were coming and were waiting for them to sail into a devastating ambush. Many have argued that the ensuing US victory was the decisive battle of the Pacific War. Historian Mark Stille disagrees with that assessment in this thoughtful and well-argued account of a battle that in retrospect seems almost pre-ordained.
Stille begins his journey to Midway in the Indian Ocean, with a Japanese task force under the command of Admiral Nagumo operating against the Royal Navy. Stille argues that some of the flaws that damaged the Japanese at Midway were exposed in that operation. For Midway, Stille describes a deeply flawed Japanese plan, ‘an illusion in every sense’, promoted by Admiral Yamamoto, a man with an inflated reputation. The Japanese, Stille argues, suffered from intelligence failures, a dissipation of forces, and wasted effort. He bursts the bubble of the myth of the desperate gamble against impossible odds on the part of the Americans. They had penetrated Japan’s plans, which allowed Nimitz to conceive a bold ambush. Stille also compares the fleets steaming towards each other across the Pacific Ocean and assesses the various commanders. He argues that the IJN offensive doctrine betrayed a fundamental hubris that led to a lack of adequate air defence, no early warning system, ineffective gunnery, and poor damage control. The US, on the other hand, employed radar and had sturdier aircraft, with the exception of the vulnerable and obsolete Devastator. Midway itself was heavily defended and unlikely to fall to Japanese invasion. With all that in place, Stille works his way through the narrative of the battle.
We join the Japanese fleet ignoring signs of US naval activity, which Stille argues was indicative of their ‘inflexibility and lack of imagination’. On 3 June, the Japanese targeted Midway with minimal success. The next day, the Japanese failed to find any signs of the closing US fleet. That allowed the American aircraft to strike first. Though their air operation was disorganised, that may have helped the Americans and created confusion in the Japanese fleet. Stille highlights Nagumo quickly losing control of the battle, then he started to lose the carriers as US dive-bombers struck home. A Japanese counter-attack damaged the US carrier Yorktown but also left the remaining IJN air squadrons diminished. Moreover, their attack revealed the last IJN carrier, which the Americans were quick to assault. The loss of all the IJN carriers brought the primary battle to a close, with some USN air attacks continuing on fleeing IJN cruisers, one of which was sunk.
Stille examines the reasons for the Japanese defeat, which amounted to a flawed IJN plan and faulty intelligence, and they broke all the principles of warfare. Yamamoto’s reputation as a brilliant admiral was undeserved and his IJN commanders committed too many errors, leaving victory almost impossible to achieve. Their air defence system also failed under the influence of Japanese ‘Victory Disease’, the hubris that comes from winning. For the Americans, Nimitz’s high risk plan worked despite tactical errors. Admiral Fletcher’s performance, Stille contends, was ‘flawless’, and while Admiral Spruance was hampered by staff incompetence, that was offset by excellent leaders amongst the squadrons. Ultimately, Stille concludes, ‘the Americans assembled the bare minimum required for victory.’ He notes the common view that Midway was a David and Goliath battle but argues that this was not the case. Midway was not the decisive battle of the Pacific War, but it decisively ended Japanese expansion. The US seized the strategic initiative, but even if they had not, the US industrial trajectory to support the war effort would have inevitably defeated Japan. Stille includes a what-if argument over the intended Japanese assault on Midway island, which he concludes was also destined for failure, and an alternative timeline for the Battle of Midway based on changing small events to affect the greater outcome. That, Stille argues, would have remained much the same as the historical timeline.
Mark Stille’s Midway is an engrossing analysis of the most famous battle of the Pacific War. Befitting his own career, Stille’s emphasis is on the intelligence side of the battle, from its inception to controlling the battle space while the chaotic fighting raged across the waves. Stille burrows into the minds of the commanders, analysing all the components of the battle as the commanders knew them, then he reconstructs their intended plans from the evidence. His conclusions differ from many previous attempts to understand, and in many cases, glorify the American victory. Stille’s interpretation is well-argued and posits a more predictable victory than others have suggested. He is undoubtedly correct in most of his assertions, making this a book to be reckoned with by future historians, though to this reviewer, Stille downplays the role of US initiative especially when set against the Japanese rigidity that he describes to great effect. Students of Midway have to read this book to grasp the full picture of that immense and important battle
