Tim Moreman, Second Arakan 1943-44 (Osprey, 2025)
For going on two years, the British and Commonwealth forces had been on the receiving end of the relentless Japanese forces in Burma. Pushed back to the Indian border, the Allies were demoralised with many believing the Japanese were invincible. But, by mid-1943, the time to strike back and win had come, and the British chose the Arakan region to launch their offensive despite a previous failed effort. In this engrossing narrative, Time Moreman takes us through that campaign.
After a brief overview, Moreman considers the commanders at the operational level for both sides and assesses their respective forces and weapons, including air power. He moves on to their battle plans, noting the strategic indecision amongst the British commanders. They knew approximately what they wanted to do, but final objectives and methods caused dissention, In the end, what they could do was mostly dictated by the available resources. The Japanese had their strategic problems too, with the more ambitious, some might say foolish, commanders wanting an offensive, while others thought defence in depth was best.
In August 1943, XV Indian Corps began to take up positions for the offensive. There followed a slow and methodical approach down to the Japanese lines, again dictated by communications and logistical requirements. They pushed the Japanese back, with some units learning how to fight on the job. The African 81st (WA) Division joined in the fighting in January 1944, and they too forced the Japanese to retreat. The offensive was assisted that month by Allied success in the air. However, the ground assault was meeting greater Japanese resistance, which culminated in the Allied failure to take the fortress of Razabil in late January. In February, the Japanese launched their own offensive in north Arakan, leading to fierce fighting, particularly around Allied defensive ‘boxes’, including the intense eighteen day siege of the Admin Box. The West Africans in the Kaladan Valley were also hit by a Japanese assault that caused the Africans considerable anguish. Nevertheless, unlike earlier in the war, the Allies stood fast for the most part, and the Japanese assaults broke against them. When the late monsoon crashed down in June, the Allies had achieved most of their goals while proving that the invincibility of the Japanese soldier was indeed a myth. Better troops, and more of them, better training, air superiority, improved tactics, and Japanese intransigence all played a role in this portentous Allied victory in Burma.
Second Arakan might have been a sideshow compared to the huge battles to come that would decide the fate of Burma, but as Moreman points out, this campaign restored Allied confidence and proved the worth of their forces when taking on the Japanese. It is a fascinating story well told by Moreman and admirably supported by Osprey’s graphics and illustrations. He also brings out the contributions of the Commonwealth forces, which have often been overlooked by previous historians. Any reader interested in the war in the Asian sub-continent will appreciate this book.
