Mark Lardas, US Navy Pacific Fleet 1941 (Osprey, 2024)
There can’t be many readers unaware of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 and the devastation it wreaked on the US fleet sitting at anchor. But what was that fleet? How had it developed, and what was it designed for? Mark Lardas takes on the task of answering those questions in this book in Osprey’s Fleet series.
Lardas begins with the fleet’s main purpose, which was to project power across the Pacific ocean. The Americans built their ships accordingly and within the parameters agreed in the various inter-war treaties. Lardas notes that the US had five categories of warships: battleships, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. They were supported by fleet auxiliaries. He then works his way through the different classes of ships, detailing their specifications and their roles in the fleet. Along the way, we learn about carrier, anti-aircraft, and submarine doctrines in box-out sections. Lardas goes into more detail on technical factors, such as surface combat and anti-aircraft guns, torpedoes (among the world’s worst in 1941), radar, aircraft, and, of course, the men who operated them all. The latter are described by Lardas as skilled and dedicated, serving under competent officers.
Lardas next surveys how the fleet operated, considering doctrine and command. We discover that the US was well aware of the threat Japan posed in the Pacific and thought it had planned aggressively, under the leadership of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, for the coming conflict. Lardas argues that criticisms over US neglect of air power was unfair based on limited carrier availability. Turning to intelligence and communications, Lardas highlights the flaws that led to Pearl Harbor; although the intelligence department knew the pieces of the jigsaw, it did not put them together. Controlling such a large ocean required efficient logistics, and Lardas argues that this necessity shaped the fleet. He also notes the central importance of Pearl Harbor as a base. When it came to preparing for combat, the US mistakenly believed it had superiority over Japan, and that by using Wake Island as a forward base, Kimmel thought he could lure the Japanese into a decisive naval battle. But then came Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, which scuppered all of Kimmel’s plans, leading to his replacement by Admiral Chester Nimitz. However, Lardas contends that the US fleet was far from degraded by the Japanese attack. Indeed, the destruction of the battleships helped the US develop a better fleet based on carriers and submarines, thus overcoming one of the 1941 fleet’s glaring weaknesses.
In US Navy Pacific Fleet 1941, Mark Lardas has written an excellent addition to Osprey’s Fleet series. He packs a lot of information into a relatively short survey, describing a fully operational navy ready for almost anything the Japanese could throw at it. But, as Lardas makes clear, it was a fleet already obsolete in some respects and underdeveloped in others. Lardas also covers all the major aspects of the fleet, from technical stats to operational planning. His engaging text is well supported by Osprey’s usual graphics and photograph selection. Any reader with an interest in the Pacific War or naval warfare will enjoy Lardas’ book.
