Justin Williamson, Son Tay 1970 (Osprey, 2024)
It sounds like a simple enough proposition; take some hand-picked men deep into enemy territory and rescue a few dozen prisoners of war. In 1970, the US military decided to do just that by staging a raid into North Vietnam to assault a compound at Son Tay. But that proposition was far from simple and would require a complex support operation as well as a clockwork attack on the compound. There was only one problem, but it was a big one.
Williamson begins with an overview of the increasing number of US POWs held in North Vietnam by 1970, their maltreatment, and the efforts to retrieve them. The US conducted aerial searches for POW camps and zeroed in on a likely candidate for a rescue mission at Son Tay, northwest of Hanoi. Williamson outlines the debate in the US military on how a rescue mission might be conducted. Once the army had decided how to do it, a force was selected, and training began on an audacious plan that required precision timing for the raid and the highest level of interservice cooperation and support. The US knew that Son Tay was a well-guarded compound with a secondary building nearby, which they were less sure about. Moreover, a late intelligence flight suggested that something was ‘off’ about Son Tay, but by then, the mission was set to go. On the following night, 21 November 1970, the green light was given.
The mission consisted of one team on a helicopter that would crash land inside the compound before they assaulted the guards and rescued the POWs, while the rest of the teams landed outside the compound to provide support and interdict any rescue attempt. Meanwhile, the Navy and Air Force would conduct diversionary bombing missions and provide air cover. The plan was executed almost perfectly despite a couple of hiccups that usually happen on night-time missions. However, the biggest problem the rescuers found was that there was no one to rescue! The POWs had been moved months before the mission. It was a frustrated raiding party that flew home, though thankfully with no casualties other than a broken ankle and general disappointment. They returned to a political firestorm over the raid and its apparent failure, but the military view was that while this might have been an intelligence failure, it was worth the effort for morale purposes and to show it could be done.
Justin Williamson tells a fascinating story, and an important one in the development of special forces operations. In a relatively slim volume, he covers all the bases very well, though I would have liked to see more first-hand accounts from those involved. He is supported by the customary high quality Osprey maps and artwork; the latter being atmospheric rather than informative, but the illustrations fit the text. Readers of the Vietnam War and special operations will enjoy this very much.
