by RNS | Jun 3, 2025 | Beating Tsundoku
Nic Fields, The Jugurthine War 112-106 BC (Osprey, 2025)
Most students of ancient warfare will associate the Numidians with their role in the Punic Wars between Rome and Carthage. Indeed, this is the first we hear of Numidia, a north African state, consisting of a few agricultural communities and a vast interior populated by nomadic herdsmen. They had fought with the Carthaginians and then with Rome, becoming something of a vassal state. However, that casual relationship blew up in Rome’s face in 112 BCE when Numidian internal political divisions exploded into a civil war, forcing Rome to intercede against a usurper king, Jugurtha. Nic Fields takes us into the ensuing war that escalated into a level of brutality that even shocked many Romans.
The uncertainties of studying ancient history are immediately apparent in the Jugurthine War for which we have no certain chronology; our main historian, Sallust, having no interest in such matters. Nevertheless, Fields is able to answer most of the how and why questions. The Numidian Jugurtha was in illegitimate prince who had fought alongside Rome in Hispania, where he learned the Roman art of war, which he would use to his advantage against them when the time came for him to usurp the Numidian throne and take on the legions. He fought, or bribed (allegedly), a few Roman generals, but his nemesis would be the infamous Gaius Marius, a provincial aristocrat but also a seasoned general.
Fields examines the opposing forces. The core of the Numidian army was a body of lightly armed foot-soldiers supplemented by some heavier infantry, archers, and elephants. But it was their light cavalry that presented the greatest threat to the legions when operating in a combat environment more conducive to mobile warfare. The Roman manipular legion presented too much of a challenge to the Numidian army in pitched battles, as demonstrated by the Roman general Quintus Metellus at the Muthul river in 109 BCE. Jugurtha withdrew, however, into the mountains and plains where he could wage guerilla warfare, while the Romans ravaged towns and settlements. Metellus could not beat Jugurtha that way. Enter Gaius Marius with a larger Roman army and more brutal tactics, leading to the shocking destruction of the Capsa in 107 BCE. Still Jugurtha fought back, forcing Marius onto the defensive. It would be treachery rather than battlefield victory that brought Jugurtha down when Bocchus, the king of Mauretania, betrayed Jugurtha to the Romans. The war was over. Fields concludes by examining the historical consequences of the Jugurthine War, which was far-reaching militarily and politically.
The Jugurthine War is not one that automatically comes to mind when thinking of Rome’s great campaigns, yet as Fields demonstrates in this slim volume in Osprey’s excellent Campaign series, it highlights many of the problems facing the Romans as their Republic faltered in the late second century BCE. This was not a war that favoured the Roman style, and it required innovations that prompted military reforms and definitively altered Roman politics. Fields works his way through the causes and consequences while narrating the main events in his usual authoritative manner, supported by Osprey’s customary high quality graphics and illustrations. Fields’s The Jugurthine War fills an important gap in Osprey’s coverage of Rome’s wars, and it is an enjoyable and informative read.
by RNS | May 31, 2025 | Beating Tsundoku
Jeffrey R. Cox, Dark Waters, Starry Skies (Osprey, 2025)
The Pacific theatre in World War II was a sprawling mess, one which is difficult to describe accurately except in broad brushstrokes. We see the big picture, the main strategic thrusts and the major battles featuring carriers and battleships, but the nitty-gritty of the war fades into the background. To bring out a more detailed view of the theatre, we need to examine it under a magnifying glass. In Dark Waters, Starry Skies, Jeffrey Cox shines a light onto a slice of the Pacific war, the Guadalcanal-Solomons campaign from March to October 1943, revealing an intense tactical conflict on land, air, and sea.
Cox opens with European missionaries held captive then executed on the Japanese destroyer Akikaze, which he then follows into battle on escort duty around Guadalcanal. That widens out into the broader effort by Japan to resupply and seize control of Guadalcanal at the end of 1942. Cox almost gleefully describes the failure of this mission. The Japanese turned to retrenching in the Solomons and New Guinea, building intermediate airfields, which Cox argues should have already been done. The loss of Buna early in 1943 hampered this operation too as the Allies built airbases, which accompanied by rampant US submarines, would wreak havoc on the Japanese. Nowhere was this more true than in the Bismarck Sea that the US had turned into a shooting gallery. Such was the mayhem that the Japanese came to believe that missionaries on the islands were passing information to the Americans. That led to the war crime on the Akikaze, told in horrific detail by Cox.
Cox turns his attention to the US, beginning with their strategic considerations and allocation of commands. From there, Cox narrows in on the island of Guadalcanal and the stranding of the 1st Marine Division for them to protect a vital airfield. Cox notes that the naval and air action around Guadalcanal fluctuated between day and night, with the Japanese controlling the dark; meanwhile on land, the Marines mowed down reckless Japanese infantry assaults. The appointment of Admiral Halsey to command forces in the South Pacific galvanised Americans in all the services, and the war changed. The US navy took on the Japanese, sometimes at point-blank range: the tide was turning.
Having established a platform for both sides in this increasingly chaotic conflict, Cox embarks on a rollercoaster narrative of almost non-stop action, with two themes familiar to students of the Pacific War: Japanese deterioration and the inexorable rise of the US, though not without its complications. In February 1943, the Guadalcanal campaign ended, which was followed by a lull and reorganisation, then the two sides came to grips again in the Solomons. Cox notes that the US relied on airpower while building its naval forces. The Japanese suffered from navy-army infighting, which did not help them in either arena, and their air force suffered from irreplaceable losses. Under the waves, the submarine war did not all go the US’s way either, but again, they could replace losses while Japan increasingly could not. Cox argues that the US did win the intelligence war hands down, calling that the difference between victory and defeat. This dominance showed in the remarkable assassination of Admiral Yamamoto, which had little strategic effect but boosted US morale. Cox continues with blow-by-blow accounts of the fighting on and around New Georgia and New Guinea. Ultimately, the ‘domino’ theory the Japanese employed for its island hopping conquest worked against them, beginning with the loss of Guadalcanal. Cox closes by returning to the Akikaze war crime, who ordered it and why it was never investigated properly.
Jeffrey Cox has written a stirring and authoritative account of the Solomons campaign. His narrative is all-encompassing, from the highest levels of decision making to the bridges of the competing ships to the pilot’s cockpit and the infantryman’s foxhole. Cox is free with his opinions on it all, sometimes, maybe too often, sliding into sarcasm when hindsight reveals what he thinks should have been obvious to those dishing out the orders. That is a good thing because this is never a dry and dusty historical account but an action-packed narrative that puts Cox’s readers into the heart of the combat. For those readers interested in the experience of war, rather than the rivet-counters and tech obsessives, this is a stirring and illuminating book.
by RNS | Apr 27, 2025 | Beating Tsundoku
Lawrence Paterson, Kriegsmarine Atlantic Command 1939-42 (Osprey, 2025)
Pity the merchant navy ships crossing the Atlantic in the early years of World War II. They feared the U-boats, but arguably worse was spotting a ship on the horizon and identifying it as one of Germany’s battleships on a raiding mission. There was little chance of escaping those big guns. The battleships belonged to the Kriegsmarine Atlantic Command, and in this new Fleet series book from Osprey, Lawrence Paterson surveys Germany’s surface menace.
Paterson begins with the surprise of World War II’s opening shots for a navy that was not ready. Then he works back to the Treaty of Versailles and subsequent efforts to skirt its restrictions, most notably by building ‘pocket’ battleships. However, Grossadmiral Raeder was wedded to surface fleet power, which limited submarine and air power development, though U-boats would soon be on the rapid building list just before the war. Lack of building capacity curtailed fleet development, leading to the concept of merchant raiders to strike and run on convoys before the Royal Navy could react. Paterson surveys the fleet available to Raeder as the war commenced, beginning with the battleships Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Tirpitz, and Bismarck then the pocket battleships Deutschland, Admiral Scheer, and Admiral Graf Spee. Then came the heavy cruisers Admiral Hipper, Prinz Eugen, and Blücher, followed by the lighter vessels, including the destroyer and torpedo boat flotillas and minesweepers. Gunnery was, of course, important to surface vessels, and Paterson considers those next before moving on to the kriegsmarine’s constantly evolving command structure and all the internal friction that entailed. Paterson follows the fleet’s move to the French coast after the fall of France in June 1940, placing them on the Atlantic coast. That is a convenient transition to discuss operational doctrine.
The kriegsmarine adopted the Kampfgruppe concept, assembling battle groups to pursue singular objectives. This helped target Allied convoys but proved somewhat impractical with the adopted risk-averse approach to combat and potentially losing ships. Paterson also reviews naval intelligence and the roles of logistics and facilities, particularly those on the French coast. Paterson’s analysis of combat operations is conducted chronologically, including the demise of the Graf Spee, destroyer actions launched from Brest, the 1940 anti-convoy operations of Admiral Scheer and Admiral Hipper, and a series of successful anti-convoy actions in 1941 by Gneisenau and Scharnhorst, though these would be the last conducted by capital ships. Then RAF raids took their toll, putting Gneisenau out of action, followed by the Bismarck sinking and myriad mechanical problems with the other capital ships that limited operational effectiveness. In the wake of Bismarck’s loss, Hitler shut down operations other than the defence of Norway while he prepared for the invasion of Russia. Finally, the capital ships dashed through the English Channel from beleaguered Brest, in February 1942, and escaped to Germany. They never re-emerged, effectively ending German surface naval operations in the Atlantic. In his analysis, Paterson notes Hitler’s interference as the main reason for the failure of the Atlantic fleet, though the capital ships had demonstrated what they could do when unleashed.
Lawrence Paterson has written a succinct but engrossing account of the Kriegsmarine Atlantic Command. Many casual readers of the German navy’s exploits will be familiar with singular events, such as the sinking of the Bismarck or the hunting of the Graf Spee, but Paterson ties those events into the broader picture of naval operations. That brings out the destructive potential of the raiding strategy but also illustrates its shortcomings and outright failures. In the end, Paterson’s survey highlights the recklessness of Germany’s premature decision for war in 1939, when the Navy was clearly unprepared, but also what might have been if they had waited; that is a counterfactual worth thinking about.
by RNS | Apr 24, 2025 | Beating Tsundoku
Angus Konstam, Convoy PQ-17 1942 (Osprey, 2025)
In 1941, the Germans launched an invasion of the Soviet Union, putting the latter under severe pressure. They needed Allied supplies, most of which had to be delivered by sea from the UK via Iceland. That still meant running the gauntlet past German-held Norway. Though slow to react, by mid-1942, the Germans had deployed a small battlefleet to Norwegian waters, led by the battleship Tirpitz. That obliged the Royal Navy to maintain a fleet off Norway to protect the convoys. For the merchant ships, this was exceedingly dangerous work made even worse if the escorts withdrew, which is exactly what happened to Convoy PQ-17. Angus Konstam brings that story to us in Osprey’s newest Campaign volume.
On 27 June, convoy PQ-17, consisting of 36 merchant ships, most of them American, sailed from Iceland bound for Archangel in northern Russia. On hearing the Tirpitz fleet might intercept, the allies ordered the convoy to scatter, and the British ships withdrew. PQ-17 was on its own. Only 11 ships got through, the rest falling to the luftwaffe and U-boats, but the Tirpitz had never sailed. Konstam surveys the commanders on both sides in the convoy war then moves on to the ships, aircraft, and submarines. The respective plans come under Konstam’s review, which amount to getting the convoy intact to Archangel for the Allies, and the ambition of the Germans was to stop them, though there was much more than that needed to achieve victory. Then Konstam begins his narrative of the operation, the tension ratcheting up as the convoy sailed east from Iceland. The U-boats attacked first but were beaten off. Then the luftwaffe arrived, but to little effect as the convoy escorts saw them off too. But then came the fatal order to scatter. Konstam analyses this, noting that the Royal Navy believed that the Tirpitz group had sailed, but the decision to scatter, based on incomplete information, was a terrible mistake. Then the slaughter began – the graphic map of sinkings illustrates Konstam’s terrible tale. In his conclusion, Konstam leaves no doubt that the destruction of convoy PQ-17 was a complete disaster for the Allies, and that the subsequent inquiry laid the blame at the wrong door.
The fate of Convoy PQ-17 is a tragic story, and one that is well told by Angus Konstam. That is something that you might expect from such a prolific naval historian. While the format for the Campaign series is quite formulaic, Konstam lays out the disaster step by step, sinking after sinking. He also pulls no punches when it comes to apportioning blame for the disaster. Osprey provides its usual high quality graphic support for Konstam’s text. Anyone interested in the convoys will appreciate this book.
by RNS | Apr 19, 2025 | Beating Tsundoku
Tim Moreman, Second Arakan 1943-44 (Osprey, 2025)
For going on two years, the British and Commonwealth forces had been on the receiving end of the relentless Japanese forces in Burma. Pushed back to the Indian border, the Allies were demoralised with many believing the Japanese were invincible. But, by mid-1943, the time to strike back and win had come, and the British chose the Arakan region to launch their offensive despite a previous failed effort. In this engrossing narrative, Time Moreman takes us through that campaign.
After a brief overview, Moreman considers the commanders at the operational level for both sides and assesses their respective forces and weapons, including air power. He moves on to their battle plans, noting the strategic indecision amongst the British commanders. They knew approximately what they wanted to do, but final objectives and methods caused dissention, In the end, what they could do was mostly dictated by the available resources. The Japanese had their strategic problems too, with the more ambitious, some might say foolish, commanders wanting an offensive, while others thought defence in depth was best.
In August 1943, XV Indian Corps began to take up positions for the offensive. There followed a slow and methodical approach down to the Japanese lines, again dictated by communications and logistical requirements. They pushed the Japanese back, with some units learning how to fight on the job. The African 81st (WA) Division joined in the fighting in January 1944, and they too forced the Japanese to retreat. The offensive was assisted that month by Allied success in the air. However, the ground assault was meeting greater Japanese resistance, which culminated in the Allied failure to take the fortress of Razabil in late January. In February, the Japanese launched their own offensive in north Arakan, leading to fierce fighting, particularly around Allied defensive ‘boxes’, including the intense eighteen day siege of the Admin Box. The West Africans in the Kaladan Valley were also hit by a Japanese assault that caused the Africans considerable anguish. Nevertheless, unlike earlier in the war, the Allies stood fast for the most part, and the Japanese assaults broke against them. When the late monsoon crashed down in June, the Allies had achieved most of their goals while proving that the invincibility of the Japanese soldier was indeed a myth. Better troops, and more of them, better training, air superiority, improved tactics, and Japanese intransigence all played a role in this portentous Allied victory in Burma.
Second Arakan might have been a sideshow compared to the huge battles to come that would decide the fate of Burma, but as Moreman points out, this campaign restored Allied confidence and proved the worth of their forces when taking on the Japanese. It is a fascinating story well told by Moreman and admirably supported by Osprey’s graphics and illustrations. He also brings out the contributions of the Commonwealth forces, which have often been overlooked by previous historians. Any reader interested in the war in the Asian sub-continent will appreciate this book.
by RNS | Apr 14, 2025 | Beating Tsundoku
Mark E. Stille, Leyte Gulf (Osprey, 2025)
The Battle of Leyte Gulf, fought in October 1944, was the largest sea battle in history, involving hundreds of ships and nearly 2,000 aircraft, though most of them on the US side. The scene was the Philippines, which the US intended to invade, and the Japanese had to defend at all costs. Stille points out that the battle consisted of a series of engagements over three days, and the outcome was decided by mistakes on both sides. The US split their fleet, which led to a communications breakdown, but the Japanese erred much more by joining battle in the first place, which was tantamount to a suicide mission. The resulting Japanese debacle left the US in charge of the Pacific. But, Stille notes, the battle is still controversial and obscured by myths. To dispel those myths is the purpose of his book.
Stille takes on the challenge of the purpose of the Japanese battle plan, which they thought they could win when every indicator was against them. The second myth is the role of Halsey in what some argue was an American military defeat – it was certainly not, argues Stille. Halsey famously broke off the main fleet to pursue a Japanese force to the north with his fleet. Many see that as foolish or an act of braggadocio, but Stille argues otherwise even though Halsey performed poorly in the battle that ensued. The third myth Stille explores is that the Japanese should have destroyed the US force known as Taffy 3 at the Battle of Samar, one of the Leyte Gulf engagements. Stille sees that as unreasonable. The Japanese commander at Samar, Kurita, should have then attacked into the gulf where the main invasion force lay, goes the next myth. Again, Stille argues in favour of Kurita. Moreover, Stille contends that even if Kurita had done so, it would not have impacted the American progress in the Philippines to any tangible effect. Stille highlights the engagement off Formosa as the preamble to Leyte Gulf and proposes that the Japanese defeat there made US victory at Leyte Gulf almost inevitable; a ‘maritime execution’, in Stille’s words, in which Japanese sailors ‘paid an appalling price for the vanity of their leaders’.
This is the paperback edition of Mark Stille’s analysis of the Battle of Leyte Gulf fought in October 1944. Stille takes a thematic approach, analysing the myths in turn. He goes into considerable detail on the significant engagements, and his willingness to take on the myths surrounding this battle sets up enough argument to keep any reader of the Pacific War on their toes. Stille has written an engaging text that will appeal to the novice and specialist alike.
