by RNS | Feb 12, 2025 | Beating Tsundoku
David Hebditch, Covert Radio Agents 1939-1945 (Pen & Sword, 2021)
Imagine being stuck in a dank cave or halfway up a jungle mountain for months on end with one mission to carry out, watch for enemy ships and report them back to your country, all the while risking torture and execution if you make a single mistake. That was the duty of an incredibly brave cadre of radio operators during World War II. David Hebditch surveys their work, and their fates, in this riveting book.
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Hebditch sets out by explaining recruitment and training for this most dangerous of wartime jobs. It is hardly surprising that he uncovers the most extraordinary cast of characters, both men and women, that made it through the process, be they British, Australian, Soviets, or any of the nationalities fighting the Nazis. Hebditch tells their stories; of British and Norwegian agents, some skulking in Norwegian caves, covered in lice, and only emerging at night; of Australians lugging massive radio sets around small, Japanese occupied islands; of radio operators dropped into occupied France not knowing who to trust when they arrived. They did know that an implacable enemy tracked and hunted them even as they reported the movements of enemy ships or assisted the resistance. Hebditch includes Soviet agents operating throughout Europe in his survey, though I was not sure if this fell too far into the broader espionage category rather than the mission specific activities of the coastwatchers or the Jedburgh teams. Throughout his book, Hebditch weaves many technical aspects of the agents’ tradecraft and the counter-measures taken to track them down, and he describes the inter-agency rivalries that sometimes led to disaster.
This is not an exhaustive study by any measure, but for the casual reader, Hebditch brings to light many operations and characters they may never have heard about. The author also provides enough information for us to understand how operations were conducted. There are a few snarky asides that Hebditch could have excised, but that is a quibble on style rather than a complaint about the content. He adds a good number of photographs to illustrate his text, which is a bonus, particularly on the technical material. Hebditch’s book works as a surface treatment of this fascinating subject, and is well worth reading.
by RNS | Feb 4, 2025 | Beating Tsundoku
Peter Williams, Japan’s Pacific War (Pen & Sword, 2021)
As the World War II generation finally departs, it is a sobering thought that most of the available understanding of how that conflict was experienced remains Anglocentric. Military history in particular requires a more global perspective. Match that chasm to the still popular perception of the Japanese as mindless automatons charging recklessly into battle with no fear of death, and you can see the need to create a more complete picture. For Japan’s Pacific War, Peter Williams interviewed over forty Japanese veterans, allowing us, in a limited way, to see who was on the ‘other side’ and what they did.
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Across 25 chronologically arranged chapters, Williams allows the Japanese veterans to tell their stories with few interruptions other than for clarity and to check the historical record. The veterans fought on land, air, and sea, though the emphasis is on land combat. We join the veterans at the start of the war and follow along with their initial victories. Their high morale is evident, but the problems that plagued the Japanese war effort start to show. Even in the early campaigns, the soldiers were hungry, and as the war progressed, their logistics completely broke down, resulting in starvation – Williams notes some cases of cannibalism by the truly destitute. The Japanese relied on speed and manoeuvrability in their early gains, but when the tide turned, they found themselves outgunned and increasingly undermanned. They were not helped by tactical naivety that saw them attack relentlessly or dig in and refuse to retreat unless the circumstances were truly desperate, thus the creation of the popular myth of mindless Japanese soldiers. That attitude was aided by their fear of capture, though those who were captured expressed surprised at the humanity of their enemies. Most of Williams’ interviews were from Japanese who fought Australians, who were often described as tenacious but cautious. They had less respect for the Americans. Most of the experiences of the Japanese can be placed inside their cultural bracket, but when they were beaten and knew it, their distressing plight echoes across all military history. The Japanese martial culture reasserts itself, however, through the shame and guilt some survivors felt after the war.
Since John Keegan and other historians revolutionised military history to examine war from the ground up, the collected memories of soldiers have proved to be an invaluable resource. Translated Japanese accounts are still relatively rare, however, particularly those related to fighting Australians. Williams’ interviews are therefore a significant addition to the field. But memory is often faulty, either subconsciously or deliberately, and soldiers’ memoirs must be treated with caution. Williams mentions this in his introduction, but by presenting his material seemingly as lightly edited source material, he mostly skirts this issue. It is left to the reader to investigate the veracity of these narratives when set against the backdrop of what we know about the often appalling Japanese behaviour in World War II. Nevertheless, these are fascinating accounts that offer important insights into the combat experiences of Japanese warriors.
by RNS | Jan 28, 2025 | Beating Tsundoku
James H. Willbanks, Hamburger Hill 1969 (Osprey, 2024)
The Vietnamese called it Dong Ap Bia, just another mountain in South Vietnam. But the Americans who fought there would name it Hamburger Hill. Operation Apache Snow should have been a straightforward assault to take the high ground at the north end of the A Shau Valley from the NVA and block access into the interior of South Vietnam. But the Americans and their ARVN Allies bit off more than they could chew, and the attack became a ten-day battle of attrition that led to serious military and political consequences. In this new Osprey book in their Campaign series, James H. Willbanks tells the story.
The A Shau Valley, Willbanks notes, was one of several gateways into South Vietnam; one which the US had tried to close in 1966 but remained a thorn in their side into 1969. Their new plan, set for May 1969, would be to take down NVA bases in the valley and disrupt their logistics. Willbanks reviews the respective commanders, of which Lieutenant Colonel Weldon F. Honeycutt appears most often in the following narrative, and the organisation of the forces about to fight for control of Dong Ap Bia, designated Hill 937, and it’s neighbours. Operation Apache Snow opened on 10 May with a US barrage and helicopters inserting infantry into their jump-off areas. Honeycutt was in charge of the assault on Dong Ap Bia, but what he did not know was that he was badly outnumbered by a well dug-in NVA force. Forebodings of an NVA trap soon spread amongst the advancing US soldiers, then they ‘kicked over a hornet’s nest’ of enemy fire. The attack bogged down despite intense artillery fire and aerial bombardment. As attempt after attempt failed, US casualties grew while their morale dropped, which wasn’t helped by numerous incidences of friendly fire, but Honeycutt drove them on. Finally, after ten days of intense fighting, the NVA resistance collapsed. But only a few weeks later, the US withdrew its forces, sharpening the question, was it worth it? Politically, Willbanks makes clear that it was not, although US generals in Vietnam thought otherwise. US public opinion, already waning after the Tet Offensive, turned irrevocably against the Vietnam War, and Nixon called for the policy of Vietnamization. Hamburger Hill would therefore be the last action of its kind.
Hamburger Hill is one of the better know Vietnam War battles, partly through a 1987 movie dedicated to it, and because it was such a politically contentious affair back home in the US. If you have not heard of it, Willbanks’ introductory survey is a useful starting point. He controls the broader story well while picking out illustrative parts of the action on the ground. Willbanks’ narrative is heavily one-sided with the NVA set up as a mostly faceless enemy and bodies to be counted in the aftermath, but I doubt that most of his readers will object to that bias. He is ably supported by Osprey’s informative colourful maps and flavourful artwork. This is a book that provides a window into the Vietnam War, and beginners and ‘veteran’ readers alike will enjoy it.
by RNS | Jan 26, 2025 | Beating Tsundoku
Jaap Jan Brouwer, The German Way of War (Pen & Sword, 2021)
In The German Way of War, Jaap Jan Brouwer examines how World War II was fought by the German army and compares that to the two main Allied armies in the West: Britain and the United States. The Germans, Brouwer finds, adopted a command concept known as Auftragstaktik that diffused decision-making and initiative down through the ranks. That system compared favourably with the Americans and British in all the important aspects of infantry fighting, including army structure, leadership, training, and morale. Brouwer tests his thesis using examples mostly from the Italian, North African, and Western Fronts, with the Germans attempting to stave off Allied onslaughts in all three. In the end, he argues that the Allied victory was principally one of quantity over quality.
To make his case, Brouwer compares the strengths of the Germans to his perceived weaknesses of the Allies. Although based on the evidence, it is a selective approach open to counter-examples and contextual argument. In addition, Brouwer gives the Eastern Front little attention, and his argument that the German rank-and-file displayed little ideological motive is questionable. Thus, Brouwer’s thesis is not as strong as it first appears, but it is an interesting one to consider.
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by RNS | Jan 10, 2025 | Beating Tsundoku
Mark Lardas, USN Submarine v IJN Aircraft Carrier (Osprey, 2025)
It sounds improbable, like something out of a sensational war movie; a US submarine sinking an Imperial Japanese aircraft carrier. Yet, even with all the protection offered to carriers by escorting warships and air cover, this remarkable feat happened ten times in World War II. In this book in Osprey’s Duel series, Mark Lardas tracks the paths of two very different types of warships to their fateful destinations on the high seas.
Lardas takes turns in describing the design and development of US Navy fleet submarines and Imperial Japanese carriers. Both were vulnerable in their own ways with almost every aspect planned out for maximum combat efficiency. Lardas considers their respective structure, propulsion, and weaponry, including the American failure to recognise the deficiencies in their early war torpedoes. The men who operated these machines also come under Lardas’s scrutiny. Here too, he notes that almost everything was honed to winning in combat, but the Japanese were notably more so to the detriment of their damage control functions. That would play a critical role in the survivability of the carriers when struck by US torpedoes. Lardas selects five brief case studies to demonstrate his points, of which two stand out: the Nautilus’s problems with dud torpedoes in 1942 when attacking the Naga, and the Albacore’s sinking of the Taiho in 1944 when the latter’s failed damage control operations could not save the carrier. In his analysis of 67 combats between USN submarines and IJN carriers, Lardas highlights the procedure for a successful attack, particularly after 1943 when the US resolved it dud torpedo problem. Conversely, there were no submarines lost to Japanese carriers in the war. Lardas concludes that the USN submarines ultimately won the fight against the carriers.
There is always something useful to learn from Osprey books; the condensed nature of the shorter format effectively highlights the main points under discussion. That is the case too with Lardas’s latest contribution. I am not sure, though, that the structured format for the Duel series works well for combat between submarines and carriers, with the case studies almost squeezed out by technical aspects that sometimes seem tangential to the events. I would have liked to have read more on the combat, but that is a quibble more than a complaint. Nevertheless, as an introduction to this aspect of the war in the Pacific, Lardas’s book works well enough, and Osprey’s graphic artwork illustrates his text to the usual high standard.
by RNS | Dec 30, 2024 | Beating Tsundoku
Nicholas Sekunda, The Athenian Army 507-322 BC (Osprey, 2025)
It is a cliché that in Ancient Greece the Athenians ruled the waves while the Spartans controlled the land with their seemingly invincible army. But as Nicholas Sekunda demonstrates in this new book from Osprey’s Elite series, Athens had an army too and they worked to overcome their challenges in land warfare every bit as much as they put that effort into naval warfare.
Sekunda begins with the reforms of Cleisthenes in 507 that revolutionised the Athenian military system alongside his political reforms. This was the army that was soon to be tested in the Persian Wars from 490, where we find Athenian hoplites trying to solve the problem of Persian archers. By 483, the Athenians had added their own archer contingent, Sekunda finds, along with some tactical changes. Cavalry soon joined the mix, and their numbers were increased in Pericles’ reforms of 442 and horse-archers added. Then came the Peloponnesian War and the use of lighter armed peltasts, which were originally foreign forces, but Athens soon trained poorer citizens in this manner of fighting. Sekunda also covers the doomed Syracuse expedition of 415. With Athenian defeat in the Peloponnesian War came more reforms including the redevelopment of horse archers into dedicated scouts. Another set of reforms followed in the 360s inspired by Xenophon. Both equipment and practices changed, but that did not help the Athenians when they suffered defeat to the Macedonians at Chaeronea in 338. An attempt to throw off the Macedonian yoke in 323 proved disastrous for Athens, all but ending their military system, which Sekunda decides is a useful place to stop.
It might come as a surprise to some readers that armies in the Classical period were not ossified institutions immune to change or tactical subtlety. Sekunda makes clear that the Athenian army certainly made changes when faced with new enemies or tactics. Although his book is a brief introduction, Sekunda packs a lot of information into his text, and he is well supported in the details of costume, arms, and armour by Osprey’s excellent colour plates of Athenian soldiers and the accompanying text. My only quibble is a lack of background on ancient Greek warfare, which would have proved useful to novice readers in this field. Nevertheless, readers looking for a wee bit more meat on the bones for this era in military history will find this book very useful.
