by RNS | Sep 6, 2026 | Beating Tsundoku
William E. Hiestand, Tanks in the Caucasus 1942-43 (Osprey, 2026)
Tank warfare on the Eastern Front in World War II conjures up images of hundreds of tanks fighting across wide open plains. But, as William Hiestand illustrates in this Osprey New Vanguard series book, the Caucasus theatre was unusual because the German panzers initially outnumbered the Soviet T-34s, then the Soviets fought back using a variety of Allied lend-lease tanks.
Hiestand opens with the launching of Operation Barbarossa on 22 June 1941, noting that through the opening phases, the Germans operated combined-arms formations that used better doctrine, organisation, and tactics to defeat their enemies. But they ground down in Russia, encountering supply problems and finding tanks hard to replace. Seizing the Caucasus oilfields became Germany’s primary task for its armour in the southeast. Hiestand describes the German tank formations assigned to the task then moves on to the Soviets. They were rebuilding and reorganising, which Hiestand walks us through, but they were short of home produced tanks. The Allied Lend-Lease programme helped with that. Hiestand describes the tanks from both sides: German Panzerkampfwagen IIs, IIIs, and IVs, the new Tigers, Stugs, Marder IIs, and specialised command tanks; Soviet T-26s, BT-7s, T-34s, KV1s, T-60s, and T-70s; and the Allied Lend-Lease tanks, including Valentines, Stuarts, and Grants.
Having set the scene, Hiestand narrates the campaign. He begins with Operation Edelweiss and Germany’s panzers driving towards the Caucasus oilfields, brushing aside the meagre Soviet defences. But Soviet resistance stiffened behind defence-friendly terrain while nipping at the German advance, which ground to a halt before reaching key strategic objectives. The failure to capture Stalingrad threatened the German position in the Caucasus, and they siphoned off units to assist the beleaguered city. The Soviets, meanwhile, were a gathering storm, aided by the infusion of Lend-Lease tanks. Conversely, the loss of tanks adversely affected the Germans, which was not helped by grinding Soviet frontal attacks. By August 1943, argues Hiestand, both sides were exhausted and offensive operations ceased. The Germans would eventually withdraw. In his analysis, Hiestand emphasises the qualitative German advantage over the Soviets, but as the campaign wore on, the Soviets regained cohesion and were able to launch costly counterattacks that halted then turned the German offensive.
Tanks in the Caucasus is an interesting and informative overview of combat on the eastern front. Hiestand lays out the context and technical aspects of the campaign and provides a useful operational narrative of events. I would like to have seen a bit more on how the combat was fought at a more granular level, particularly with regard to the Soviet use of the Lend-Lease tanks, but that is not the remit of these New Vanguard books, and Hiestand includes a handy bibliography for those seeking more in-depth coverage. Readers of the Eastern Front will enjoy this somewhat different slice of the campaign, and tank enthusiasts will, of course, lap it up.
by RNS | Sep 1, 2026 | Beating Tsundoku
Steven J. Zaloga, US Tank Tactics in World War II (Osprey, 2026)
Tanks are synonymous with land combat in World War II. German panzers appear to take up most interest amongst tank enthusiasts, with the American tanks lagging behind. That is perhaps appropriate given that the US lagged behind when it came to developing tank warfare and tactics. In this book, in Osprey’s Elite series, Steven Zaloga surveys the US’s efforts to catch up with other powers as they entered World War II and the sometimes painful lessons they learned along the way.
Stemming from their WWI experience, US tank tactics were focused on infantry support, and tanks were distributed across infantry units. The US stuck to this theory even as the alarm bells of war started ringing in the 1930s, but Germany’s blitzkrieg changed all that. When France fell, the US adopted mechanisation. Zaloga narrates that development and then delves into the rudiments of US tanks, tactics, and organisation. He describes the light and medium tanks and demonstrates that the most basic tactic was centred on the tank’s crew and their drills. From 1940, the infantry support function remained, but a more destructive component was added. Zaloga works his way through the organisation of tanks formed into platoons, companies, battalions, regiments, and divisions. But these were all untested until 1943, and combat inevitably leads to change. That takes Zaloga into North Africa and Sicily, the lessons for the latter gleaned from failures in the former. A renewed emphasis on infantry support was a major change but one that that was difficult to effect given the war’s spread into the Pacific and the demands of the service. Zaloga notes also that the demands on tanks in France would be different from the other theatres. Getting tanks onto the D-Day beaches was one such problem that the US needed to negotiate; dealing with Normandy’s infamous bocage was another. Zaloga examines the thorny problem of communications between tanks and between tanks and infantry. That involved experimenting with radios and telephones. The use of tanks in a breakthrough situation was also a tactical requirement that was tested in France, as was the new obstacle of fighting in urban environments. Zaloga highlights the rarity of tank vs tank combat before September 1944 in Lorraine, where superior US tactics defeated the heavier German panzers. Then came the Battle of the Bulge that December, where German and US tank forces ground each other down. Zaloga notes the importance of combined arms tactics in all of this. Zaloga turns to the Pacific theatre and the deployment of amphibious tanks by the US Marines and their subsequent use as artillery as well as infantry support. Zaloga concludes with the lessons the US learned from World War II and the reorganisation of 1947.
Steven Zaloga has written an engaging and informative survey of US tank warfare in World War II, which is well supported by Osprey’s usual excellent graphic artwork and photographs. He balances a discussion of both the organisation of tanks and tactics as they evolved to uncover a story of assumptions tested by combat and the lessons American commanders drew from that. He also provides examples of US tanks in combat told from the viewpoint of the participants. However, Zaloga’s focus is primarily on the war against Germany, and he gives the Pacific theatre a thin veneer of attention. He might have been better served to ignore the Pacific and change the title. Nevertheless, readers of World War II will enjoy reading this introductory work, which Zaloga notes fills a puzzling gap in the literature on US tank warfare.
